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1.  Introduction 
 
While China’s rapid economic development is impressive, water stress in Northern China is a 
widely recognized crisis.  Water stress occurs when the demand for water exceeds the available 
amount during a certain period or when poor quality restricts its use.   One of the common 
indicators  of  water  stress  is  per  capita  renewable  water;  1000  cubic  meters  per  capita  is 
recognized as a critical level for severe water scarcity (Engelman and LeRoy, 1993).  The three 
major basins in Northern China (Huai, Hai, and Huang/Yellow, the 3-H basins, Figure 1) all 
have less than 1000 cubic meters per capita, and in arid northwestern China the number is even 
lower (Cai and Rosegrant, 2005). This water stress is also reflected in other indicators.  In 1997 
the 3-H basins contained about 40 percent of the country’s agricultural land and produced 32 
percent of the country’s GDP, but had less than 8 percent of the country’s water resources (CAE, 
2001). 
 
Figure 1: The 3-H Basins (Huai, Hai and Huang) in Northern China. 
 
Water stress in Northern China has intensified water use conflicts between upstream and 
downstream areas and also between agriculture, which is still the largest water consumer, and the 
municipal and industrial sectors (M&I), which have been growing fast.  Water stress has also 
caused deterioration of fresh water resources in terms of quantity (aquifer over-exploitation and 
dry rivers, etc.) and quality (eutrophication, organic matter pollution, saline intrusion, etc.).  If 
left unresolved, such problems may worsten until they threaten social stability.  The Chinese 
Government has initiated strategic changes to reform water resources allocation. especially to 
transfer agricultural water to other sectors.  During the coming adjustment period, agriculture 
will collide head-on with industry, cities, and ecosystems.  Agriculture faces the most difficult 
adjustment, in order to ensure that sufficient water is available for more essential uses in cities 
and industries.  The critical question is how to implement new allocation policies which cause 
the  least  disruption  to  agricultural  output  and  the  livelihoods  of  farmers  (especially  poor 
farmers). 
 
This paper reviews water transfers in Northern China, which are a cause for concern over the 
social stability, economy and environment of the region.  Based on an integrated analysis of 
economic,  environmental,  fiscal  and  social  implications,  this  paper  attempts  to  begins  by 
identifying critical barriers to smooth water redistribution; and ends with implications for policy   3 
reforms from a perspective of social equity.  Social Equity implies that the decisions of water 
reallocation under water stress should be shared by communities at all levels, from the local to 
the national, to ensue equal access of water, especially the availability of the basic water need 
(Gleick, 1996), for all groups.   However, to understand the necessity and complexity of the 
agricultural water transfers, it is first necessary to discuss the causes of water stress in Northern 
China. 
 
2.  Causes of Water Stress in Northern China 
 
The limited water availability due to low and unevenly distributed rainfall and runoff has 
been recognized as a natural cause of water stress in Northern China.  Research has also found 
that runoff generation in the region shows a declining trend during recent decades.  Compared to 
the annual average during 1956-1979, average precipitation in the 3-H basins decreased by 9.6 
percent, runoff decreased by 23.8 percent, and flow to the ocean decreased by 58.6 percent (CAE, 
2001).  At the regional scale, surface runoff generation within Hebei Province has declined by 65 
percent and inflow declined by 72 percent compared to the average in the 1950s (Li and Wei, 
2003).  The impact of global climate change on water availability in this region needs further 
monitoring. As in many other regions in the world, the impacts of human activities on runoff 
generation include deforestation, agricultural and urban development, and groundwater overdraft.   
According  to  the  assessment  of  the  Chinese  Academy  of  Science  (CAS,  2005),  in  Northern 
China during 1988-1999, vegetation coverage (percentage of the total land) decreased from 38% 
to 32%, urbanized area increased from 5.0~8.2% to 6.5~9.5% (varying over eastern, western and 
central  parts),  and  the  change  of  agricultural  land  varies  by  region.    Around  urban  areas 
agricultural land has been converted to urban; on the other hand, in mountain areas, which were 
the primary areas of runoff generation, forest and grass land is being replaced by crop land due to 
growing  population  in  rural  area.    This  land  use  conversion  reduces  soil  water  storage  and 
increases flooding.  
 
Starting in the early 1950’s, the practice of developing engineering facilities to catch and 
redistribute  water  has  dominated  water  resources  management  in  Northern  China.    Huge 
engineering efforts have been made to catch the precipitation and runoff in the region.  In 1995, 
the reservoir storage of the 3-H basins was 1.6 times of their total annual runoff (Rosegrant et al., 
2002).  Water storage and water diversion and extraction engineering facilities can easily divert 
all renewable water in Northern China.  One can understand the scope of these diversions by 
imagining that gates crossing many rivers in this region are used to completely divert flood water 
for groundwater recharge in the dry floodplains.  Since no more water can be caught for use 
within the region, engineering now turns to trans-boundary water transfer projects.  For example, 
the south-north water transfer (under construction), will transfer 38-48 billion cubic kilometers 
of  water  (comparable  to  the  total  annual  runoff  in  the  Hai  River  and more  than  that  of  the 
Colorado River) from the Yangtze River in southern China to Northern China (mainly the urban 
and industrial region in the Hai River Basin) over a distance of more than 1000 kilometers.  
Water  resources  engineering  development  in  Northern  China  is  impressive  and  has  indeed 
supported growing water demands.  However, it is widely believed that there is little potential for 
engineering left within the region.  Even the Ministry of Water Resources (MWR) has attempted 
to change the engineering-dominated water management.  A new strategy has been proposed,   4 
called resource-based water management, which is an economic-theory approach centered on 
water demand management (Wang, 2003). 
 
The water stress problem in Northern China should be re-examined from a water demand 
management perspective given excessive and still growing demand due to population growth, 
food demand increase, and industrial and municipal development. According to the assessment 
of CAE (2001), between 1980-1999, water use in Northern China (withdrawal) has increased by 
41.7 cubic kilometers (CAE, 2001), which is about the average total annual runoff in the Hai 
River  Basin,  and  1.3  times  of  that  in  the  Colorado  River  Basin.  In  2004,  the  total  water 
withdrawal in the 3-H basins was 137 billion cubic meters (km
3), which was 70 percent of the 
total annual runoff in the basins.  Water demand, particularly M&I, will continue to increase.  
According to a medium projection made by CAE (2001), in the 3-H basins, between 1997 and 
2010, water demand will increase by 13.0 cubic kilometers (8 percent); and between 1997 and 
2030, 31.4 cubic kilometers (20 percent). For the same region, Rosegrant et al. (2002) made a 
business-as-usual projection of the water demand increase between 1995 and 2025 as 49 cubic 
kilometers, close to the high projection of CAE.  The continuous increase will make the water 
supply system more vulnerable. 
 
Agriculture is the largest water user in Northern China.  In the 3-H basins, agriculture was 
responsible for 84 percent of total water consumption in the region; the fraction declined in 
recent years but it is still over 75 percent (Rosegrant et al., 2002).  Like in many other countries 
and regions, low irrigation water use efficiency is accused to be responsible for water stress at 
present.  According to the statistics in the Annual Book of Water Resources in China over 85 
percent of the irrigation is done through overflow methods and open water channels (MWR, 
2001).    Starting  from  the  middle  1990’s,  the  Chinese  government  has  greatly  increased 
investment for irrigation system updating. However, the implementation of advanced irrigation 
technologies faces many technical difficulties (Henry, 2004) and social-economic blocks, which 
will be discussed later in this paper. 
 
Moreover, many  Chinese  researchers  believe  that  water  pollution  is  the  biggest  cause  of 
water  stress,  particularly  Northern  China  (Jiang  et  al.,  2004).    Due  to  rapid  industrial  and 
municipal development and a large increase in agricultural fertilizer and pesticide use in the past 
two  decades,  cases  of  downstream  users  receiving  polluted  water  from upstream  lands  have 
dramatically increased.   During 1980 – 2004, sewage water discharge doubled in the 3-H basins, 
and it increased by 160 percent and 140 percent in the Huai and Huang River, respectively, 
according to the annual water resources bulletins of the 3-H basins. 
 
3. Water Transfer and Social Equity 
 
Under  water  stress,  conflicts  in  water  allocation  and  the  damages  to  the  public 
environment  have  intensified,  and  a  pressing  concern  for  “social  equity”  has  appeared  in 
Northern China.  Social equity implies fair access to resources and livelihood; the concept of 
what  is  “fair”  reflects  the  ethical  values  shared  by  the  society,  as  well  as  economic  values 
associated with resource uses.  Social equity reflects a principle that each citizen regardless of 
economic statuses or personal traits deserves and has a right to be given fair treatment by the 
political system, giving special attention to the needs of weak and vulnerable populations.  In the   5 
context of resource allocation, social equity refers to a bundle of rights and duties of government, 
collective, and/or individuals, which are applied to protect weak and vulnerable populations in 
society.  With  social equity  in  water  resources in mind,  it is  interesting  to  see  that Chinese 
Government is promoting a national strategy called “building a harmonious society”.  Challenges 
of social equity in water allocation under aggravated water stress are worth great attention, since 
water  is  a  basic  resource  for  life  and  production  in  society,  and  is  an  essential  part  of  any 
harmonious society. 
 
3.1. Setoral water use conflicts and agricultural water transfers 
 
With water supplies in Northern China declining in absolute and quality-adjusted terms 
and water resources already over-allocated, one of the key questions facing water managers and 
residents will be how to meet growing demand in the municipal and industrial (M&I) sectors.  
According  to  CAE’s  assessment  based  on  various  statistics,  during  1980-1999,  in  Northern 
China, the fraction of agricultural use decreased from 84 percent to 73 percent, while the fraction 
of M&I water use increased from 22 to 28 percent.  The assessment and projection of M&I 
fraction in the 3-H basins are shown in Figure 2(a, b)  
Figure  2:  M&I  fraction  in  the  3-H  basins  (a)  individual  basins  in  1998  and  2004  (sources: 
bulletins  of  3-H  basins);  (b)  3-H  basins  together  in  1997  (assessment)  2010,  and  2030 
(projections) (source: CAE, 2001). 
 
One  clear  opportunity  to  meet  the  growing  M&I  demand  is  through  change  in  inter-
sectoral allocations.   In the competition for scarce water, local authorities generally give higher 
priority  to  industry  than  agriculture,  while  municipal  and  domestic  uses  receive  the  highest 
priority.  This is because water used in industry has a much higher economic value, and China’s 
local officials want to facilitate growth in industrial production more than agriculture. Hence, 
when there is a decision to be made on whether water should be sent to an industrial facility or 
kept  for  agriculture,  industry  often  wins  out  (Lohmar  et  al.,  2002).    Sectoral  transfers  have 
already occurred within large basins, provinces, cities, or counties.  Table 1 compares water uses 
by sector in two periods (1988-92 and 2002-2004) in the Yellow River Basin.  In the middle and 
lower  parts  of  the  basin,  agricultural  water  use  decreases  significantly  while  industrial  and 
domestic increases dramatically.  The only increase of agricultural water occurs the upper basin, 
but the increase is relatively small.  Table 1 also illustrates a common upstream-downstream 
water allocation problem.  In the Yellow River, more than half of the runoff generated by rainfall 
comes from the upper reach and fewer people live there, therefore, upstream water users suffer 
less  water  stress.  Furthermore,  upstream  provinces  such  as  Ningxia  and  Inner  Mongolia 
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in the middle and downstream provinces.  This explains why there is an increase of irrigation 
water use in the upper reach (Table 1).   The double threat of continuous increase of water use in 
the upstream provinces and increasing local M&I water use has escalated the agricultural water 
shortage  in  downstream  provinces.    In  1987,  the  State  Council  of  China  issued  the  “Water 
Allocation Programme” along the Yellow River, which specifies water withdrawal quotas for 
each province along the basin. For example, the downstream Shandong Province can withdraw 
7.0 cubic kilometers, about 19% of the total allowable water withdrawal in the basin.  However, 
the  actual  water  withdrawal  by  Shandong  depends  on  how  much  those  upstream  provinces 
withdraw, as well as the runoff generated in a specific year.  The Yellow River Conservation 
Commission (YRCC) has been responsible for the realization of this policy, but actual water 
allocation has not followed the rules until the policy was strengthened in most recent years to 
prevent flow cutoffs in downstream main channel.  YRCC has also improved the monitoring 
system including monitoring facilities and institutions along the River.  
Table 1.  Yellow River water uses by sector (billion cubic meters), 1988-92 and 2002-2004 
 
Years  Reach  Total  Agricultural  Industrial  Domestic 
 Upper   13.11  12.38  0.51  0.22 
 Middle   5.44  4.77  0.38  0.28 






  Basin  30.72  28.39  1.45  0.89 
 Upper   17.54  15.71  1.42  0.41 
 Middle   5.71  4.16  0.97  0.58 






  Basin  31.69  26.91  3.21  1.57 
 Upper   34%  27%  179%  84% 
 Middle   5%  -13%  155%  108% 




   Basin  3%  -5%  121%  77% 
 
  a) Data from Chen, 2002 
  b) YRCC Water Resources Bulletins of 2002-2004. 
 
Agricultural water transfers have occurred in large irrigation districts of China.  Hong et 
al. (2001) presented such an example with the Zhanghe Irrigation District located in northern 
Hubei Province.  Although this area belongs to Central China, it is on the boundary of Northern 
China and represents typical agricultural water transfers in large irrigation districts in China.  As 
shown  in  Figure  3,  there  has  been  substantial  reallocation  of  water  from  agriculture  to 
hydropower generation and industrial and domestic uses over the past several decades, especially 
during the 1980s and 1990s.  In late 1970s, agriculture covered 80 percent of total water use in 
the region; while around the middle 1990s, agriculture only used less than 25 percent of the 
water  and  non-agriculture  used  over  75  percent.    This  sharp  decline  in  water  supply  for 
agriculture led to a 40 percent decline in irrigated rice area (Figure 4). Although the irrigated 
area  decline  is  considerable  (40  percent),  it  is  much  less  than  the  decline  in  deliveries  of   7 
irrigation water (about 67 percent).  Moreover, the crop yield per hectare has doubled from the 
1960s to the 1990s (mainly due to the use of hybrid rice), and the yield per cubic meter of water 
supplied has tripled, which shows that there have been considerable water savings.  A number of 
factors have contributed to the water saving, including new irrigation techniques (e.g., alternate 
wetting and drying at the farm level, canal lining, etc), development of alternate sources such as 
rainfall harvest by small reservoirs, groundwater, and reuse of return flow, as well as crop pattern 
change from two to one crops of rice.  It is believed that the sharp reduction of irrigation water 
has forced farmers to adopt cost-effective water saving techniques.  Meanwhile, the government 
investment in the improvement of irrigation systems and adoption of the new technology (e.g., 
hybrid rice) has played a critical role in maintaining the livelihood of farmers in the area.  A 
major challenge is to identify those practices that could be successfully extended to other regions, 
both inside and outside China. 
 
     
Figure 3: Annual water allocations for irrigation and other uses (in the unit of million cubic 
meter [mcm]) Zhanghe Irrigation District, 1965–1998 (Source: Hong et al., 2001). 
 























































   
Figure 4: Irrigated area (mainly rice) in Zhanghe Irrigation District, 1966-1998 (Source: Hong et 
al., 2001) 
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Large and medium irrigation districts in China often use reservoirs for flow regulation 
(i.e., storing water in wet periods and releasing water in dry periods) for irrigation water supply, 
and some of the reservoirs also have other functions such as hydropower generation and flooding 
control.  Water transfers are often implemented through modification of reservoir operations.  
For the Zhanghe Irrigation District, reservoirs and diversion canals were originally designed for 
irrigation, but now larger priorities are given to hydropower generation and urban water supply.  
Consequently,  reservoir  release  is  driven  by  energy  demand  and  domestic  water  use  timing 
instead of crop water requirements.  Such reservoir function and operation changes might have 
far-reached impacts if they are extended to other parts of China.  In the summer of 2000, the 
author of this paper visited a county in northeastern Hubei Province, which was hit by a serious 
drought in that year. The county has a medium-size irrigation district fed by a reservoir.  Farmers 
used to get water from the reservoir through canals when drought occurred.  However, in that 
year, farmers did not get water for quite many days.  Ponds for drinking water dried up in most 
villages.  Farmers complained that the reservoir authority tried to hold water as long as possible 
for the newly developed tour business at the reservoir site, unfairly withholding the farmers’ 
water. 
 
Agricultural water transfers are even more needed and have been undertaken much more 
extensively around urban areas.   A typical case about Beijing municipality and neighboring 
agricultural  counties  was  described  by  Peisert  and  Sternfeld  (2004).    The  administration  of 
Beijing includes several agricultural counties such as Miyun, Huairou and Yanqing.   To protect 
water  quantity  and  quality  supplied  to  the  Beijing  municipality,  restrictions  have  been 
established for land and water uses and agricultural development in those counties.  The cause of 
the urban-rural water conflicts sparked by Beijing’s growing municipal water demands is the 
burden  of  restructuring  the  counties’  agricultural  sector.    In  2001  the  government  of  Miyun 
county announced it would completely abandon growing cereals, and instead develop perennial 
cultures, mainly fruit trees.  Another major shift in the county’s agricultural sector coming in 
2001 was a complete ban on chemical fertilizers within the next five years, in favor of organic 
fertilizers.    Miyun’s  land  conversion  and  organic  programs  are  in  line  with  a  general 
restructuring of Beijing’s agricultural policy, as announced in March 2001: Grain-growing areas 
will be reduced to save ground water, and more trees will be planted. Animal breeding and 
‘highly efficient’ agriculture with modern water-saving irrigation methods will be developed.  It 
is  predicted  that  the  water  used  in  agriculture  will  drop  to  35  percent  of  the  city’s  water 
consumption in 2010 from 43 percent in 1998, and the figure will continue to drop to 28- 30 
percent in 2020.  Regulations lay out some compensation and alternative economic development 
strategies  for  the  counties,  including  funds  for  cereal  to  fruit  field  conversion  and  organic 
programs.  However, these have not yet been fully carried out.  Peisert and Sternfeld (2004) 
argued that there is still a long way to go for the transition of land use and other agricultural 
practices to be completed, due to the current lack of an institutionalized compensation system to 
replace  the  current  ad  hoc  downstream-upstream  compensation  payment  occurring  annually.  
Peisert and Sternfeld think that any format of payment in the system “must be transparent and 
include mechanisms to directly reward upstream farmers and cities for protecting the watershed”. 
 
Agricultural  water  use  reduction also  has  other causes.    For example, On  the  North 
China Plain, prolonged extraction of ground water for industry has greatly lowered the water 
table under many urban districts, which enforced farmers in and around these urban regions to 
draw their water from deeper and deeper wells (Lohmar et al., 2002).  Another cause is the   9 
quality degradation of agricultural water caused by industrial waste water discharge. Although 
industrial wastewater treatment capacity has grown tremendously in the past several years, in 
most cities a large portion of industrial effluents are still discharged directly into rivers.  Surface-
water is often too polluted to be used for irrigation.  Following the Environmental Protection 
Law of China (approved in 1989), all provinces have established quotas of pollutant discharge in 
waste water for urban communities and various industrial sectors.  However, “local officials 
often sidestep legislation and regulations designed to curb such pollution in order to keep local 
industries profitable” (Lohmar et al., 2002).   Effective inspection and monitoring is needed to 
ensure the full execution of those regulations. 
 
There is evidence that agricultural water transfers requested by local industry were denied 
despite the fact that industry is generally a higher value use (Lohmar et al. 2002).  Upstream 
irrigation districts that have built their own reservoirs and canal systems have little incentive to 
provide water to industrial centers, since their own agricultural activities would be adversely 
affected.    For  example,  several  major  cities  in  Henan  Province  failed  to  access  water  from 
reservoirs controlled by local agricultural authorities; as a result they had to shut down some 
factories even as rice production was expanded in the region.  These conflicts usually represent 
the  divergent  goals and interests  of the urban construction authorities versus  the  local  water 
resource bureaus and agriculture bureaus. 
 
Finally,  it  is  noticed  that  several  large-scale  agricultural  water  transfers  have  been 
undertaken to restore ecological systems in Northern China.  The most high-profile example 
occurs  with  the  Yellow  (Huang)  River.    Due  to  excessive  river  diversion  and  a  prolonged 
drought cycle, flow cutoffs had been experienced in the main channel downstream from 1972-
1998.  Flow in the main channel was cut off in 21 of 30 years with both the duration of time and 
the  distance  from  the  river  mouth  increasing  each  year.    The  flow  interruption  left  users  in 
Shandong  and  Henan  Provinces  without  their traditional  sources  of  surface  water, and more 
seriously, it precluded sediment flushing to the ocean and threatened the downstream ecosystems 
(Li, 2002).  Starting from the year 2000, the Yellow River Conservation Commission (the basin 
management authority under MWR) has undertaken firm administrative measures to prevent the 
river cutoffs, including water withdrawal monitoring and more strict execution of the “Water 
Allocation Programme” with the provinces in the upstream of the basin.  The status of the river 
has since been improved, and there has been no absolute flow cut-off in recent years.  Meanwhile, 
irrigation water withdrawal by the upstream provinces has declined.  According to a news report 
from MWR (MWR, 2005), irrigation districts in Ningxia reduced water withdrawals by 2.2 km
3 
during 2001-2005, which is about one-quarter of the total withdrawal by Ningxia in 2000. 
 
Another  example  of  agricultural  water  transfer  to  ecosystem  has  occurred  in  the  Hei 
River Basin, an inland basin in northwestern China (Liu et al., 2005).  The Hei River flows from 
the upstream Gansu Province to downstream Inner Mongolia region, where the river water feeds 
the Erjina Oasis and traditional pasturelands around the Oasis. Starting from the early 1980s, 
large expansion in irrigation water diversion in the middle stream of the basin has resulted in 
downstream  ecosystem  degradation  including  a  shrinking  oasis  area,  declining  vegetation 
coverage, and a complete dry-up of the outlet lake.  The environmental change threatens the 
homeland of more than one million people who depend on the pastureland for livestock breeding. 
In the late 1990s, the Chinese government initiated activities for the ecological restoration of the   10 
region, including annual flow releases to downstream by administrative order.  These activities 
followed  institutional  development  including  activating  the  “Gansu-Inner  Mongolia  Water 
Allocation Plan (GIWAP)” approved by State Council and establishing the Bureau of Hei River 
Management, an agency that is authorized to coordinate and supervise the implementation of the 
new water allocation plan.  These releases have prevented further degradation of the downstream 
ecosystem. Meanwhile middle stream irrigation water withdrawal is required to decline by one-
quarter,   which has led to significant crop pattern change and also stimulated irrigation system 
updating with financial support from the central government (Liu et al., 2005).  In Zhangye City, 
the  major  agricultural  district  in  the  middle  stream  of  the  Hei  River  Basin,  the  shares  of 
agricultural land were 65% cropland, 16% forestland, and 19% pastureland in 1999; and recently 
the shares were adjusted to 52%, 26%, and 22%; during 2000-2003, canal lining was improved 
for 585 km of main canals and 1160 km of branch canals, and advanced irrigation systems such 
as  low-pressure  pipe,  drip,  and  sprinkler  systems  were  established  for  29,000  hectares  (10 
percent of the total irrigated area in the district). Moreover, in 2000 the MWR approved an 
experimental program for water conservation in Zhangye, which is the first program for testing 
comprehensive  water  demand  management  measures  in  China.  The  program  is  intended  for 
determining both primary water use rights and water use permits and facilitating both water trade 
and public participation in water allocation. 
 
3.2. Dilemmas in water transfers 
 
Given the growing supply/demand imbalance in Northern China, it will be increasingly 
difficult  if  not  impossible  to  meet  new  water  demands  from  one  sector  without  decreasing 
supplies to another.  Since agriculture is now by far the largest consumer of water resources in 
the region and appears to have relatively low economic output levels, meeting growing industrial 
and domestic demands is likely going to mean a reduction in supplies to the agricultural sector.  
However,  agriculture  in  China,  as  in  many  other  countries,  holds  a  special  place  in  rural 
livelihoods  and  national  food  security,  so  it  remains  a  high  priority.  Furthermore,  the  rural 
agricultural  sector  that  is  most  impoverished  and  has  probably  benefited  least  from  recent 
economic growth.  Shifting water away from those already relatively disadvantaged has clear 
implications for equity and, perhaps, social stability.  At the same time, it is industrial growth, 
which is dependent on increasing water supplies, which is seen as the driving force in powering 
China’s transformation to a modern, world class economy. 
 
The premise for successful water transfers out of agriculture is that farmers can use less 
water  while  food  production  is  not  affected.  There  is  no  doubt  that  advanced  irrigation 
technology is needed to replace traditional gravity systems. Starting from the mid-1990’s, the 
Chinese government has significantly increased investment for irrigation system updating, and 
low-flow irrigation such as drip and sprinkler is now gaining ground in China (Henry, 2004).  
However, the implementation of advanced irrigation technologies means a higher cost for water, 
and it is up to farmers to pay at least part of the cost.  The question is whether farmers can afford 
the cost of advanced irrigation technology, and if farmers will and can pay a water price that is 
closer to the true value of water.   The answer might be no, given the current low income of 
farmers due to low food prices and high costs of agricultural inputs such as fertilizer.  If water 
prices cause lower or negative net profits from irrigated agriculture, it may force farmers simply 
to use less water and give up high crop yields.   11 
 
There  is  a  “dead  lock”  with  agricultural  water  management  in  China,  which  blocks 
effective agricultural water savings and smooth water transfers.  The dead lock exists with the 
following conflicts, which are inter-related to each other: 1) farmers are wasting water even as 
they  suffer  water  shortage  themselves  and  leave  increasing  industrial  and  municipal  sectors 
thirsty (Henry, 2004); 2) the society needs agricultural water savings, but farmers may not afford 
the costs of water savings and because of low profits from crops their willingness-to-pay for 
water is much lower than the true water value; 3) the national policy of food self –sufficiency 
requires the maintenance of high crop yields and production that depend on irrigation, even when 
the  government  can  not  maintain  the  required  water  for  agriculture  given  the  growing 
requirements of non-agricultural sectors.  China must break this dead lock which will continue to 
damage the country’s growing economy. 
 
Difficulties also exist with the governance of water transfers in China.  Current water 
transfers  follow  the  priorities  of  local  government  that  are  often  driven  by  short-sighted 
economic profits.  There is no formal institution for mediation, so large water disputes between 
agriculture and other sectors (and also between regions) often are resolved by the government in 
an ad hoc, case-by-case fashion.  Ideally, water transfers would go through markets based on a 
deal made by both water buyers and sellers and without negative social impacts (Rosegrant and 
Binswanger, 1994).   The establishment of water rights is the pre-request of water markets.   In 
recent years, researchers and government officers begin to embrace the modern concept of water 
right and water market (e.g., Wang, 2003; Liu, 2004).  In China, water right is a kind of usufruct 
right and only the nation has the property right of natural resources. There is no clear delineation 
of the usufruct right, formal and consistent institutional support for water rights does not exist, 
and  thus  no mechanism for  economically-efficient  water  rights trading exists.   Although  the 
China Water Law approved in 1988 and amended in 2002 provides codes for water allocation 
and  use,  current  water  use  rights,  both  their  identification  and  supervision,  are  heavily 
manipulated by the powerful water bureaucracy. Conflict resolution related to water rights is 
usually  handled  by  administrative  measures  as  individual  cases,  following  some  government 
guidelines such as the Implementation Measures for Water Use Permit Systems (issued by the 
State Council in 1993).  This system, which lacks a consistent legislative framework, may not 
guarantee the security of water rights and is subject to high transaction costs, as well as social-
economic loss with the two sides involved in water transfer.   Furthermore, the current water use 
permit for agriculture is defined as a collective right for farmers in a town or even in a county, 
and individual farmers need to share the water right within their group. This may add to the 
difficulty of water right management and affect the efficiency of water right in water allocation.  
This situation has given rise to grass-root institutions in China, called water users associations 
(World  Bank,  1997).    Moreover,  in  recent  years,  in  rural  regions  of  the  country,  individual 
farmers  are  involved  in  small  pilot  trials  of  water  right  transfers,  which  are  different  from 
sporadic trades at the village level.  The purpose of those experiments is to develop formal and 
institutionalized in nature from the bottom level to higher levels (Turner and Hildebrandt, 2005).  
Several specific examples of the water right trade developments are discussed by Turner and 
Hildebrandt  (2005)  and  Liu  (2004).    Local  government  is  involved  in  the  initial  market 
development, but the challenge remains to build a bottom-up mechanism that allows farmers at 
the root level to be actively involved. 
 
3.3. Consequences and risks in water transfers   12 
 
On one hand, farmers lose water that they once used without appropriate compensation; 
on the other hand, cities and industry are thirsty and expect to access more water. Both situations 
have resulted in significant negative consequences to the regional economy and environment.   
Huge losses of food production and economic losses in industry due to water shortage have been 
reported every year by national and provincial statistics.  According to the estimate by MWR, 
food production loss in the country is 25 to 30 million tons, and economic loss in industry is 
about  200  billion  RMB.    For  the  future,  risk  of  even  more  serious  socio-economic  and 
environmental  loss  is  apparent  if  current  practices  continue  (Jiang  et  al.,  2004).    From  a 
management point of view, part of the current loss can be considered as a consequence of water 
transfer failures, including the current transfers which hurt farmers’ livelihood and income, and 
the needed transfers, which industry and cities have been waiting for but have not received. 
 
The  government  has  made  various  efforts  in  adequate  and/or  equitable  water  supply 
across the country, particularly in compensating farmers who have to reduce irrigation water use 
significantly  and  in assisting  the  agricultural  areas  to  undertake  new  development  strategies.  
Examples include the compensation to farmers in the middle stream of the Hei River Basin (Liu 
et  al.,  2005) and  farmers  in  Miyun County,  Beijing  (Peisert  and  Sternfeld,  2004).  However, 
whether the compensation is sufficient to maintain farmers’ income and livelihood and whether 
it can be fully carried out, remains a concern.  It has been noticed that farmers in Northern China 
have been struggling to reduce the income loss due to water shortage.  One effort is using waste 
water for irrigation.  Irrigated area using waste water increased from 42 thousand hectares in 
1963 to 3.6 million hectares in 1998, of which the major is in Northern China, surrounding large 
cities such as Beijing and Tianjin (Li et al., 2005). Using waste water for irrigation has brought 
up a high risk of soil contamination (CER, 1999).  An interesting question is: Where do farmers 
sell the agricultural products such as vegetables and fruits irrigated by waste water?  Another 
effort for farmers to reduce food production loss is to seek help from private entrepreneurs to use 
deep wells in order to restore irrigation (Lohmar et al., 2002).  Obviously such approaches are 
neither  sustainable  nor  adequate  regarding  public  health.    When  there  is  no  way  to  sustain 
irrigation, the problem is not only with farmers’ income and the way they depend for life, but 
also, more seriously, with the national food production target.   China never wants to see a large 
reduction of food production in Northern China as predicted by Brown (1995). 
 
Moreover, drinking water supply in rural area of Northern China is connected with the 
irrigation systems.  According to Li et al. (2005), water quality for drinking water in China is 
worsening due to reasons including excessive use of chemicals.  In those regions where irrigation 
water  is  polluted  or  is  largely  reduced  in  quantity,  drinking  water  will  be  affected  in  both 
quantity and quality. The most notorious case is the extremely high cancer rate in a number of 
villages located along some tributaries of the Huai River.  Farmers have used the rivers running 
around their villages for drinking and irrigation hundreds of years, but now they find that not 
only the water directly taken from the rivers, but also the water pumped from wells nearby the 
rivers,  is  poisonous  (news  report,  visiting  a  cancer  village  in  the  Huai  River  Basin, 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/14576/33320/33321/33754/2919537.html, in Chinese). One could 
not question the importance of industrial water users which have contributed to local economy; 
however, industrial water use that ignores the existence of downstream farmers can deplete the 
basic needs of clean, healthy water for farmers.   13 
 
When effective water transfer does not occur under water stress, water stress usually 
causes deterioration of both water quantity and quality.  It is not difficult to understand why 
instream flow and deep groundwater has been depleted and polluted in Northern China given the 
following facts: although agricultural water savings have not yet been implemented, part of the 
irrigation water has already been transferred, and although M&I has received some water from 
agriculture, it is still not fully supplied. Therefore both sides, to sustain irrigated agriculture 
under  the current  irrigation  technology  level  and  to  maintain fast  growth  of economy,  drive 
excessive water withdrawal from rivers and aquifers.  For local governments, the strong wish for 
economic development always overrides the responsibility of environment protection. 
 
So  far  in  Northern  China  the  environment,  not  the  farmers,  has  borne  the  largest 
sacrifices from water stress.  From the limited text of this paper, one sees the drying Yellow 
River, the second largest river in China, the nearly “closed” Hai River (little flow discharge to 
the ocean), groundwater depletion in the North China Plain, and ecosystem degradation in the 
downstream of the Hei River.  In addition, for many rivers, there is not enough water available 
for pollutant dilution, which has partially caused the water quality problem, and groundwater 
overdraft in coastal areas has caused sea water intrusion.  Hebei Province, located in north of the 
Yellow River and covering a major part of the Hai River Basin, is a typical case of the changed 
water environment in Northern China.  According to Li and Wei (2003), the province changed 
itself from a water-rich region in the 1950’s to a water-poor region at present.  Fifty years ago, 
Hebei  had  perennial  rivers  with  over  3000-kilometer  long  navigation  channels,  large  lakes 
including  the  well-know  Baiyangdian  Lake,  and  widely  distributed  wetlands,  and  the  region 
suffered  frequent  disasters  of  flooding  and  waterlogging  (associated  with  land  salinization).  
Today, rivers are dry most of the time, lakes and wetlands have shrunk and even disappeared 
(including the Baiyangdian Lake, “pearl” on the land of North China), and the region suffers 
damages  caused  by  water  shortage  every  year.  Such  a  change  is  caused  by  excessive  water 
consumption, as well as regional climate variability and environmental change. 
 
4. Implications for Policy Reforms 
 
Some  choices  must  be  made.    Even  if  initially  painful,  properly  conceived  policies 
executed correctly can bring tremendous long-term benefits.  Since farmers are the least able to 
cope with the policy changes needed to rationalize water supply, the key solution is then to help 
farmers to get ready for the changes, which essentially means that farmers can and will save 
water.  First of all, it is important to replace traditional low-efficiency irrigation systems by 
advanced irrigation systems, which has been occuring since the 1990s (Henry, 2004).  This will 
strengthen the physical feasibility for farmers to save water while maintaining production. The 
concern is whether the traditional focus on water supply engineering during the past 50 years can 
be switched to engineering centered on efficient water uses.  Second, farmers may not volunteer 
to save water unless they must pay higher water prices that at least partially reflect the costs of 
irrigation system updates and the economic value of water.  The economic value of water is 
much higher when water is allowed to transfer between agricultural and other sectors than when 
water use is constrained within agriculture (Briscoe, 1997).  Currently what farmers can afford 
for water is far below the true economic value of water in Northern China.  Under their current 
income level, farmers are the least able to cope with the price hikes to rationalize water supply.     14 
Therefore, agricultural water saving in China is not only a technological problem, but also a 
socio-economic  problem,  which  is  related  to  national  and  regional  agricultural  policies  and 
markets  and  even  the  international  food  markets.    For  policy  makers  in  China,  efficient 
agricultural  water  use  needs  to  be  considered  within  the  framework  of  the  nation’s  gross 
economy.  A research question is that at what level of income, farmers’ willingness-to-pay to 
water will match the economic value of water assessed from the gross economy of Northern 
China.  Starting in 2006, the Chinese government stops levying agricultural taxes, and the prices 
of agricultural products are increased  one  more level.  The impact  of  these changes  will be 
positive and broad although they will take time to emerge.  It is expected that such measures, if 
they are stable, will enable farmers to pay a reasonable price for water so that water prices can 
become an effective economic incentive for water saving. 
 
Third, an institutional establishment is needed to allow farmers and other groups to fairly 
exchange water.  The role of government in water transfers has been demonstrated in this paper. 
At least for now and in the foreseeable future, administrative means of water allocation will take 
the lead with other means such as water markets as a supplement (Turner and Hildebrandt, 2005).  
Appropriate  governance  is  still  needed  to  guide  and  manage  the  ongoing  water  transfers.  In 
particular, the mechanism is expected to provide a negotiation and mediation mechanism for 
officials and representatives from competing sectors to resolve the conflicts, and to protect the 
benefits of all, especially the weak groups. Many provinces and municipalities are promoting 
reforms  to  merge  the  functions  of  different  water  management  units  into  a  single  authority, 
called Water Affairs Bureau (WAB).  At the root level of irrigation management, the government 
has been sponsoring the development of water users associations (WUA), who not only take 
charge of water allocation among individual farmers within a WUA, but also represent a group 
of farmers (World Bank, 1997). 
 
Fourth, deliniation of secure and consistent water rights for various water users will be the 
basis for equitable water transfers among farmers and other groups.   According to Wang (2003), 
implementing water rights and water markets seems to be a long-term target for the so-called 
“resource-based water resources management” being promoted by the MWR in recent years.  
Although formal water markets are still in the experimental stage in China, they are increasingly 
playing an important role to solve water conflicts (Turner and Hildebrandt, 2005; Liu, 2004). 
Water researchers and managers in the western world might be curious about the rapid spread of 
the western economics based water management approaches in China, which have even not been 
very successful in their countries.   Given the extensive studies and practices sponsored by the 
government of China, the results and impacts might be worth of attention as time goes on. The 
involvement of government and administrative institutions in the markets under development is 
particularly  interesting.    In  the  demonstration  examples  for  market-based  water  allocations, 
which have been widely posted and discussed in China (Liu, 2004), local governments act as 
buyers or sellers in the trades between two administrative regions; meanwhile, local governments 
start to build up more formal markets based on the informal markets which have existed for long 
time.  Although water markets are certain to develop further in China, there is no doubt for 
people  both  inside  and  outside  China  that  water  markets  will  simply  supplement  the 
administrative allocation methods in the foreseeable future before consistent water rights are 
mature in China. 
   15 
The long-term planning strategies discussed above allow people in China to take time to 
perform trial-and-errors.  Due to the strong water bureaucracy in China, the need of capacity 
building in water management, and the limitations of governmental control, a “smooth” water 
transfer will take a long time- although some gradual progress can be expected.  However, what 
are the actions that need to be undertaken immediately to avoid serious social instability? First of 
all, the basic water needs, including those for drinking and ordinary living (Gleick, 1996), should 
be protected firmly for farmers and also for residents in cities.  For this purpose, some transfers 
that  deplete  farmers’  water  below  their  basic  needs  should  be  prohibited,  and  for  the  same 
purpose, some transfers must be undertaken to ensure the basic needs of residents in cities during 
drought  periods.      It  will  be  necessary  for  relevant  government  agencies  to  conduct  careful 
monitoring and quick responses to water transfer events that impact the basic needs of humans. 
 
Also, given the current serious situation of environmental flow depletion, it is critical to 
restore,  at  least  partially,  environmental  flow  to  prevent  irreversible  environmental  disasters.  
Facing the risk of environmental damage, China is beginning to recognize the spirituality of 
“human harmony with nature,” which is rooted with Chinese historical ethics of Confucius.  This 
is a philosophy emphasizing education, mastery of natural phenomena, discipline, and social 
harmony, as well as Taoism, a philosophy of non-interference (Li et al., 2004).  As illustrated by 
the environmental flow restoration in the Yellow River and the Hei River, projects have been 
initialized in Northern China. Although current measures under administrative orders impose 
large transaction costs, they show some positive signs for the restoration of environment.  The 
challenge  will  be  to  convert  the  short-term  emergency  measures  into  long-term,  sustainable 
water management and regional development plans (Liu et al., 2005).  To balance environmental 
flow requirements and offstream water consumption will be a long-term strategy in Northern 
China from generation to generation. 
           
A major tension behind the water stress is the premise of food self-sufficiency in China, 
which is important for China with a population of 1.4 billion, but also for the entire world given 
the concern of Brown (1995) - “who will feed China?”  However, there is no doubt that with the 
growth  of  China’s  economy,  the  solutions  to  the  problems  related  water  and  food  must  be 
flexible.  When there is no way to hit all targets of food production, environment restoration and 
non-agricultural water demand, a compromise solution must be found.  In a preliminary study, 
Cai and Rosegrant (2004) explored some strategies for sustainable groundwater use in Northern 
China given the fact that groundwater depletion is already a serious problem in the region.  It 
was  found  that  to  reduce  the  current  groundwater  use  to  a  sustainable  level  by  2025,  food 
production  in  the  Hai  and  Huang  (Yellow)  River  Basins  will  decline  by  15  and  9  percent, 
respectively.  Although  improvements  of  water  use  efficiency  directed  at  overdrafting  basins 
could, in theory, compensate the food production declines, they would be unlikely in reality due 
to technology constraints.  In light of this fact, will it be possible for the Chinese government to 
reconsider the food self sufficiency policy, taking into account food production conditions in 
China, food security, environmental sustainability, as well as international food markets?  This 
paper concludes with a potential alternative that could eliminate the growing water stress in 
Northern China and provide smooth water transfers between agriculture, thirsty cities, industry, 
and  the  dried-up  environment.    It  should  be  taken  as  a  research  suggestion,  not  a  policy  to 
challenge  the  national  food  self-sufficiency  policy.  The  international  community  is  now 
exploring the policy implications of “virtual water flow” (Allan, 1998), which basically means   16 
water is transferred from one country or region to another with food export/import.  The concept 
of virtual water links a large range of sectors and issues that revolve around relieving pressures 
on water resources, ensuring food security, developing global and regional water markets.  In the 
future, higher international food demand may increase food commodity prices, which will hurt 
poorer countries that must import food.  The ideal result of a global strategy of virtual water flow 
is that more food will be produced in those countries with enough water for crop growth, so that 
the  impact  of  higher  demand  (increasing  prices)  will  be  balanced  by  the  impact  of  higher 
production (decreasing prices) in the international market.  Hoekstra and Hung (2002) identified 
China as one of the top ten countries that import virtual water.  Regarding such an international 
virtual water market, China faces both challenges and opportunities.  China’s recent ascension to 
the World Trade Organization may provide larger opportunities to begin discussing such options.   
A better understanding of the role of water in economic growth in Northern China, the trade-offs 
between equity  and efficiency  in  sectoral  water  allocation, and  the  range  of  possibilities for 
institutionalizing  water  allocation  decisions  would  serve  to  better  inform  upcoming  critical 
decisions on inter-sectoral transfers. 
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